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Abstract 
 
This paper examines whether the adoption of the Statement of Statutory Accounting 
Principles (SSAP) 101, a new accounting standard that significantly limits management’s 
discretion in both the recognition and measurement of tax contingencies, affects the loss 
provisions of property-casualty (PC) insurers. We find that PC insurers significantly reduce 
their loss provisions after SSAP 101 adoption, particularly those with greater ex ante 
exposure to SSAP 101, consistent with reduced incentives to establish loss reserves for tax 
purposes. Additionally, PC insurers with greater exposure to SSAP 101 show increased 
earnings persistence and decreased returns on asset volatility, suggesting improved insurer 
transparency and an improved overall risk profile via tax avoidance mitigation. Overall, our 
study offers important insight into the economic effects of accounting standards in the 
insurance industry. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the impact of the increased accounting guidance and reporting 
requirements of the Statement of Statutory Accounting Principles No. 101, Income Taxes 
(hereafter SSAP 101) on the quality of loss reserve estimates for property-casualty (PC) 
insurers. For a typical PC insurer, the reserves for unpaid losses have significant implications 
for both its financial statements and its tax returns. Loss reserves, which accounted for 
approximately 57% of PC insurers’ total liabilities in 2012, are the largest liability in a typical 
PC insurer’s book (Petroni, Ryan, and Wahlen 2000; A.M. Best Company 2013; Cheng, 
Weiss, and Lin 2015). Unlike other types of loss reserves for non-insurance companies, 
insurers’ loss reserves are tax deductible. This unique feature makes loss reserves the largest 
deduction item on a typical PC insurer’s tax returns (Riley 2011). Given the considerable 
judgment and uncertainty involved in estimating loss reserves, prior research suggests that 
PC insurance companies overstate them to reduce tax liability (Gaver and Paterson 1999; 
Penalva 1998). Because of the economic significance of tax deductions related to loss 
reserves, in recent years the IRS has increased scrutiny of the deductions PC insurance 
companies claim in computing taxable income (Riley 2011).  
All U.S. insurance companies must prepare financial statements in accordance with 
the Statutory Accounting Principles (SAP) issued by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC).5 SSAP 101, which became effective in January 2012, requires PC 
insurers to record tax contingency reserves based on the “more-likely-than-not” merit 
threshold for each tax position, assuming that the tax authority possesses full information. 
The new requirement significantly limits judgment and discretion in both the recognition and 
measurement processes, for two reasons. First, the focus of the recognition of tax 
contingencies is on the tax positions’ technical merits, rather than the probability of audit 
                                                            
5 Public U.S. financial companies reporting to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are required to 
prepare another set of financial statements using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
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assessment or disallowance by the tax authority. Second, if the more-likely-than-not criterion 
is not met, the amount of tax contingency is measured without referring to the probability of 
possible assessment outcomes. Under SSAP 101, the increased uniformity and documentation 
for tax contingencies provides auditors and the IRS with more information about insurers’ tax 
positions. Since it is unlikely that the tax deductions related to overprovision satisfy the 
technical merit threshold of SSAP 101, this new guidance likely increases the costs 
associated with claiming tax deductions by overprovisioning. This outcome leads to our main 
prediction that SSAP 101 will improve the quality of loss reserve estimates by reducing 
insurance companies’ tax incentives in loss provisions. 
Our empirical analyses are conducted using a sample of both private and public U.S. 
incorporated PC insurance firms. Our final sample includes 6,610 firm-year observations 
between 2009 and 2014. In terms of the research design, after controlling for the known 
determinants of the level of loss provisions that prior research documents, we compare PC 
insurance companies’ loss provisions for the years before and after SSAP 101 adoption.  
Since economic conditions can induce time-series trends in insurers’ loss provisions 
unrelated to the implementation of SSAP 101, we identify insurers that are ex ante more 
exposed to the new standard as well as those that have weaker incentives to over-reserve for 
tax purposes. We employ a difference-in-differences research design to identify the effects of 
SSAP 101 adoption on loss provisions.  
Consistent with our main prediction, our results suggest that PC insurers significantly 
reduce their annual loss provision by an economically significant level of approximately 5% 
of total admitted assets after SSAP 101 adoption and the effects are significantly stronger 
among PC insurers subject to greater IRS monitoring, i.e., insurers that have greater exposure 
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to SSAP 101.6 Additional cross-sectional tests provide triangulating evidence consistent with 
tax incentives being the main channel of the observed effect. In particular, we show that the 
reduction in loss provisions due to SSAP 101 adoption is weaker for PC insurers that were 
less tax aggressive prior to the new standard: public insurers, family firms, and loss firms. 
Taken together, our findings provide strong evidence that SSAP 101 adoption significantly 
reduces PC insurers’ incentives to establish loss reserves for tax purposes. 
To explore the broader implications of the improved loss provision estimates of PC 
insurers, we examine the effects of SSAP 101 on earnings quality and firm risk. As suggested 
by our main results showing that the tax incentives in the loss reserve estimation are 
mitigated under SSAP 101, we argue that PC insurers’ loss reserve estimates will become 
more accurately reflective of the underlying economics. Consistent with our expectation, we 
document a significant increase in earnings persistence and a significant reduction in firm 
risk after SSAP 101 adoption for insurers that are more exposed to the new standard ex ante. 
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, it adds to the literature 
on the effects of accounting standards on financial institutions’ loss provisions. Prior research 
examining the relation between financial accounting and loss provisions mainly focuses on a 
setting involving banks (Scholes, Wilson, and Wolfson 1990; Warfield and Linsmeier 1992; 
Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo 1995; Collins, Shackelford, and Wahlen 1995; Chen and 
Daley 1996; Beatty and Harris 1999; Hodder, McAnnally, and Weaver 2003; Andries, 
Gallemore, and Jacob 2017), with few studies examining the insurance company setting 
(Petroni 1992; Petroni and Shackelford 1995; Penalva 1998; Gaver and Paterson 1999). The 
insurance industry constitutes an economically significant part of the U.S. financial industry 
                                                            
6 Admitted assets are assets recognized and accepted by state insurance laws in determining the solvency of 
insurers and reinsurers. State insurance laws require a conservative valuation of assets, prohibiting insurance 
companies from listing assets on their balance sheets with values that are uncertain, such as furniture, fixtures, 
debit balances, and accounts receivable that are more than 90 days past due. Only assets that can be easily sold 
in the event of liquidation or borrowed against and receivables for which payment can be reasonably anticipated 
are included in admitted assets. 
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and economy through its connection with other market participants, with net premiums 
written totaling $1.2 trillion in 2017.7  
Second, this study contributes to the broader literature on the interactions and 
tradeoffs between financial and tax reporting incentives (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001; 
Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) and more specifically to the under-explored vein of research into 
the effect of financial reporting changes on financial firms’ corporate tax behaviors. Prior 
literature employs settings involving corporate tax rate changes (Guenther 1994) and tax 
reporting changes (Guenther, Maydew, and Nutter 1997) or focusing on specific corporate 
decisions, such as executive compensation, fraud, and changes in corporate control (e.g., 
Klassen and Mawani 2000; Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew 2004; Lynch, Romney, 
Stomberg, and Wangerin 2017). In contrast to these studies, we rely on the interesting setting 
of a financial reporting change (SSAP 101 adoption) and examine our research question 
using a large sample of public and private insurers. Our study responds to the call for more 
research on the taxation of financial institutions (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) and contributes 
to a more complete understanding of the tax and financial reporting behaviors of non-
industrial firms.  
Third, we examine loss provisions – a specific account through which PC insurance 
firms engage in tax planning. As pointed out by Dyreng and Maydew (2018), while the past 
decade’s tax research makes significant progress in documenting various factors that affect 
tax avoidance (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Wilde and Wilson 2017), few studies focus on 
the specific mechanisms through which firms lower their tax burdens. Our paper advances 
our understanding of how insurance companies relying on loss reserves engage in tax 
avoidance, thus contributing to the growing literature that examines the specific mechanisms 
of tax avoidance (e.g., Randolgh, Salamon, and Seida 2005; Brown 2011; Lisowsky 2010; 
                                                            
7 PC insurers account for approximately 48%, with approximately $558 billion in net premiums written in 2017 
(S&P Global Market Intelligence).  
5 
 
Chen, Cheng, Chow, and Liu 2018; Gallemore, Gipper, Maydew 2018). Focusing on SSAP 
101 also helps to improve our understanding of how accounting standards could shape 
insurers’ tax reporting behaviors, corporate transparency, and firm risk (e.g., Frank, Lynch, 
and Rego 2009; Gallemore and Labro 2015; Balakrishnan, Blouin, and Guay 2017; Guenther, 
Matsunaga, and Williams 2017). The results of our paper should also be of interest to 
accounting standard setters, tax authorities, and regulatory bodies.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses SSAP 101, 
reviews the related literature, and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research 
design and sample selection. Section 4 presents the main results as well as the results of 
robustness checks and additional analyses and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background, Prior Literature, and Hypotheses 
In this section, we provide a brief description of the accounting and tax treatment of 
loss reserves by insurance companies and delve into prior research in this area. We then 
describe the background and some key elements of SSAP 101 before developing our 
predictions about the effects of SSAP 101 adoption on loss provisions in the PC insurance 
industry. 
2.1  Background and Prior Research on Accounting and the Tax Treatment of Loss 
Reserves  
 When insurance companies underwrite policies, they expect some future claims to be 
paid. Based on the estimate of the value of future claims made against the policies, insurance 
companies establish loss reserves equal to the expected value of unpaid losses. On the 
balance sheet, loss reserves are a liability item that the insurance company uses to absorb 
claim payments. On the income statement, loss provision is an expense.  
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Although higher loss reserves allow the insurer to be better able to absorb future 
losses, they reduce its net income, retained earnings, and regulatory capital. The negative 
effect of higher loss reserves on earnings can have unfavorable implications for insurers’ 
stock price, executive compensation, and external financing activities. Lower regulatory 
capital could also draw greater scrutiny from insurance regulators (Gaver and Paterson 1999). 
Consistent with PC insurers viewing financial reporting as an important factor in their loss 
provisions, prior research finds that managers of financially weak insurers bias their estimates 
of loss reserves downward (Petroni 1992; Petroni and Beasley 1996; Penalva 1998; Gaver 
and Paterson 1999, 2000, 2001). 
In addition to regulatory and financial reporting incentives, insurers’ loss provisions 
are further complicated by their implications for insurers’ tax liability. The tax treatment of 
loss reserves for insurance companies follows the reserve method, under which insurance 
companies can deduct the loss reserves from taxable income immediately during the current 
period. This tax deductibility feature makes loss reserves the largest deduction item on a 
typical PC insurer’s tax returns (Riley 2011). Therefore, under the reserve method, the tax 
treatment of loss reserves mimics the financial accounting treatment of loss reserves, 
resulting in a decrease in both book income and taxable income. Prior research documents 
evidence suggesting that tax incentives are an important factor in insurers’ loss provisions. 
For example, Penalva (1998) finds that financially healthy insurers tend to overstate reserves 
to reduce their tax bills. Gaver and Paterson (1999) also find that insurers’ loss reserve 
estimates are associated with tax incentives. Using aggregate industry data, Bradford and 
Logue (1999) find that firms overstate reserves in response to the tax rate reduction in the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, consistent with the tax-motivated reserving hypothesis. 
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2.2 Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1 SSAP 101 and PC Insurers’ Loss Provisions 
 Insurance companies in the U.S. are required to prepare statutory financial statements 
in accordance with SAP.8 In September 2011, the NAIC issued SSAP 101 to replace the 
former standards, effective January 1, 2012.9 The standard’s goal is to provide insurance 
companies with more consistent criteria for recording tax reserves and to require increased 
documentation of uncertain tax positions.  
 Compared to prior standards, SSAP 101 significantly reduces the threshold at which 
recording a tax contingency reserve might be required. Specifically, it addresses the 
recognition and measurement of the benefits of uncertain tax positions by setting forth a 
process for evaluating the positions: 
1) In determining the amount of federal and foreign income tax loss contingencies, 
SSAP 101 replaces the term “probable” in SSAP 5R with the term “more likely than 
not (a likelihood of more than 50 percent).” 
2) In determining the amount of federal and foreign income tax loss contingencies, it 
shall be assumed that the reporting entity will be examined by the tax authority that 
has full knowledge of all relevant information. 
3) If the estimated tax loss contingency is greater than 50% of the tax benefit originally 
recognized, the tax loss contingency recorded shall be equal to 100% of the original 
tax benefit recognized. 
                                                            
8 As explained by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), SAP does not preempt state 
legislative and regulatory authority. State variations in insurers’ accounting practices can occur in accordance 
with (1) Prescribed Accounting Practices, which are accounting practices that are incorporated directly into or 
exist in reference to state laws, regulations, and general administrative rules applicable to all insurance 
enterprises domiciled in a particular state; or (2) Permitted Accounting Practices, which are practices 
specifically requested by an insurer that depart from NAIC SAP and state-prescribed accounting practices and 
that have received approval from the insurer’s domiciliary state regulatory authority.  
9 Prior to SSAP 101, SSAP 10 (and 10R), Income Taxes, and SSAP 5 (and 5R), Liabilities, Contingencies and 
Impairments of Assets, provided standards of accounting for income taxes and a framework for measuring tax 
contingencies for insurance companies. However, these prior standards provided limited guidance on the 
recognition and measurement of uncertain tax positions. 
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 SSAP 101’s guidance in determining tax reserves is similar to the guidance provided 
by FASB Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48/ASC 740-10, hereafter FIN 48), Accounting for 
Uncertainty in Income Taxes, under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
However, FIN 48 is explicitly rejected for statutory accounting pursuant to paragraph 31 of 
SSAP 101. Although SSAP 101 does not adopt the requirement of FIN 48, the more-likely-
than-not criterion and the assumption that the tax authority possesses full knowledge of the 
uncertain tax position (ignoring audit probabilities) are similar in spirit to the provisions in 
FIN 48. Specifically, the new standard significantly limits judgment and discretion in both 
the recognition and measurement processes: (i) the recognition of tax contingencies focuses 
on the technical merits of tax positions rather than the probabilities of audit assessment or 
disallowance by the tax authority, and (ii) if the more-likely-than-not criterion is not met, the 
amount of tax contingency is measured without referring to the probabilities of possible 
assessment outcomes.  
In the absence of market frictions, such as financial reporting and tax incentives, PC 
insurers’ loss reserve estimates should equal the expected value of the unpaid losses. 
However, as discussed above, given the considerable judgment and discretion over loss 
reserve estimation, both financial reporting and tax incentives are important factors affecting 
managers’ loss provision decisions (Petroni 1992; Petroni and Beasley 1996; Penalva 1998; 
Gaver and Paterson 1999, 2000, 2001). Based on the assumption that the current period loss 
provision represents the outcome of the manager’s cost-benefit analysis exercises, we expect 
SSAP 101 adoption to significantly alter the calculus underlying PC insurers’ loss provisions. 
The increased uniformity of and documentation for tax contingencies provide more 
information about insurers’ tax positions to auditors and the IRS. Moreover, under SSAP 
101’s guidance that firms should evaluate their tax positions with the assumption that the tax 
authority will audit the positions with full information, PC insurers’ tax positions related to 
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the overstatement of loss reserves for tax purposes likely fail the more-likely-than-not 
technical merit threshold.  
The existing research generally suggests that tightened guidance and disclosure 
requirements for income tax accounting can mitigate corporate tax avoidance. Analytical 
work by Mills, Robinson, and Sansing (2010) examines the strategic interactions between the 
taxpayer and the tax authority in the context of FIN 48. Mills et al. (2010) predict that under 
FIN 48, when information about the strength of tax positions becomes observable to the tax 
authority, tax compliance improves because taxpayers claim fewer weak tax positions. 
Survey evidence from the field suggests that the willingness of a majority of tax executives to 
engage in aggressive tax planning decreases due to FIN 48 (Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and 
Shroff 2014). Examining the effect of FIN 48 on tax avoidance using a state tax setting, 
Gupta, Mills, and Towery (2014) find that both firm-level state effective tax rates and 
aggregate state-level income tax collections increase after FIN 48, consistent with the 
standard being effective in curbing corporate tax avoidance. Henry, Massel, and Towery 
(2016) examine various tax disclosure regimes and find that FIN 48 is associated with 
decreased levels of tax avoidance. 
In light of the above discussion, we expect that SSAP 101 adoption will decrease PC 
insurers’ incentives to establish loss provisions for tax-avoiding purposes, leading to a 
decrease in loss provisions following the new standard. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1: PC insurers’ loss provisions decrease following SSAP 101 adoption. 
Hypothesis H1 seeks to provide direct evidence that addresses our research question 
of whether SSAP 101 enhances the quality of PC insurers’ loss estimates by reducing their 
incentives to over-reserve for tax purposes. Since SSAP 101 applies to all insurance 
companies in the U.S., one empirical challenge in identifying the effect of SSAP 101 on 
insurers’ loss provisions is the existence of a control group. To better achieve identification, 
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we identify PC insurers that have smaller or larger ex ante exposure. We are interested in 
determining whether SSAP 101 adoption constrains tax-motivated loss provisioning 
behaviors, particularly for PC insurers that have stronger exposure to the new standard.  
2.2.2 PC Insurer Exposure to SSAP 101: Ex ante IRS Monitoring 
In recent years, tax positions pertaining to PC insurers’ loss reserves have been on the 
radar of the IRS, which has ramped up audit efforts challenging the tax deductions claimed in 
relation to their loss provisions (Internal Revenue Service 2009; Riley 2011). In November 
2009, the Large & Mid-Size Business (LMSB) Division of the IRS issued a Coordinated 
Issue Paper titled “Margins and Other Unsubstantiated Additions to Insurance Company 
Reserves for Unpaid Losses and Claims.” The paper explains the IRS’s position on PC 
insurers’ loss reserves, stating the general rule that a PC insurer’s loss reserves must represent 
the company’s “actual unpaid losses as nearly as it is possible to ascertain them.” As the title 
of the paper suggests, the IRS is concerned about insurers adding unsubstantiated “margins” 
to their loss reserves, exceeding the “fair and reasonable estimate” the regulation allows.  
Hoopes, Mescall, and Pittman (2012) find that IRS monitoring is effective in curbing 
firms’ tax avoidance behaviors. In our setting, the increased uniformity and documentation 
for tax contingencies under SSAP 101 will likely provide the IRS with more information 
about insurers’ tax positions. This gives the IRS an enhanced information advantage in 
evaluating the strength of PC insurers’ tax positions in general and in monitoring PC insurers’ 
tax-motivated loss provision behaviors in particular (Mills et al. 2010; Hoopes et al. 2012). 
Therefore, we expect insurers that underwent greater IRS monitoring before SSAP 101 to be 
more exposed to the new standard than are insurers that received less IRS monitoring. 
Empirically, we predict that PC insurers that faced higher regulatory oversight by the IRS 
before 2011 will reduce loss provisions to a greater extent after SSAP 101. Our second 
hypothesis is stated as follows: 
11 
 
H2: The decrease in loss provisions following SSAP 101 adoption is larger for  
                    insurers subject to greater IRS monitoring. 
The above prediction is not without tension. Under SSAP 101, insurers should 
evaluate their tax positions with two assumptions in mind: the certainty of an audit and the 
idea that the IRS has full information. If firms ignore audit probability when evaluating their 
tax positions and determining their loss reserves, the effect of SSAP 101 should not vary with 
insurers’ ex ante IRS audit probability. 
2.2.3 PC Insurer Exposure to SSAP 101: Ex ante Tax Aggressiveness 
We argue that PC insurers that are ex ante less tax aggressive will be less exposed to 
SSAP 101 adoption because these firms were less likely to over-reserve for tax purposes prior 
to SSAP 101. Empirically, we expect the effect of SSAP 101 on PC insurers’ loss provisions 
to be significantly weaker for less tax aggressive insurers, which were less likely to over-
reserve for tax purposes prior to the new standard.  
We identify three firm-level characteristics associated with corporate tax 
aggressiveness, as prior research suggests: (1) private ownership, (2) family ownership, and 
(3) the insurer’s loss status. First, relative to private insurers, public insurers face greater 
public scrutiny and capital market pressure to report a better performance. Therefore, public 
insurers would find it costlier to implement this tax-saving strategy because establishing more 
loss provisions means reductions in both earnings and regulatory capital (Mills and Newberry 
2001). Hence, we expect that the passage of SSAP 101 will have a greater impact on private 
PC insurers than on public ones.10 Second, prior research suggests that family firms are less 
tax aggressive than non-family firms because the former are more sensitive to the potential 
reputational costs of being tax aggressive (Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin 2010). It follows 
                                                            
10 As SEC registrants, public insurers are required to prepare their financial statements using GAAP, as the SEC 
requires. Therefore, public insurers need to prepare two sets of financial statements under both SAP and GAAP. 
For this reason, it is also likely that public insurers will be less affected by the introduction of SSAP 101 
because of their prior exposure to FIN 48, which became effective in 2007 and has technical thresholds and 
documentation requirements similar to SSAP 101. 
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that family insurers will be less likely to engage in tax-motivated loss provisioning than are 
non-family insurers. Therefore, we expect that family-owned insurers will be less affected by 
the adoption of SSAP 101. Third, relative to profitable insurers, loss insurers are less likely to 
pursue tax deductions because they have less taxable income to shield. Therefore, we also 
expect loss insurers to be less exposed to the new standard for income tax accounting. We 
formally summarize our predictions in the following hypotheses: 
H3: The decrease in loss provisions following SSAP 101 adoption is larger for 
                    private insurers than it is for public insurers. 
H4: The decrease in loss provisions following SSAP 101 adoption is smaller for 
                    family-owned insurers. 
H5: The decrease in loss provisions following SSAP 101 adoption is smaller for 
                     insurers suffering from losses. 
2.2.4 SSAP 101 and the Loss Provisions of PC Insurers: In-house Actuaries 
Our next cross-sectional analysis examines whether the use of independent versus in-
house actuaries moderates, in a predictable manner, the effect of SSAP 101 on loss provisions 
for insurers. Since 1980, PC insurers have been required by state regulators to have an 
“Appointed Actuary” certify the accuracy of an insurer’s loss reserves according to the 
“Property and Casualty Actuarial Opinion Model Law.” 11 However, in-house actuaries can 
certify loss reserves as long as they meet specific requirements.12 The estimation of loss 
reserves relies substantially on actuaries’ expertise. Insurers can use actuarial services 
                                                            
11 This model law does not contain any provision for the requirements to become an Appointed Actuary. Rather, 
the NAIC left this consideration to be addressed by the main professional association of actuaries in the U.S., 
the American Academy of Actuaries (AAA). More information about the AAA can be found at 
www.actuary.org. 
12 According to the AAA, the Appointed Actuary “is a qualified actuary who is appointed or retained to prepare 
the Statement of Actuarial Opinion … either directly by or by the authority of the board of directors through an 
executive officer of the company.” See “Statements of Actuarial Opinion on Property and Casualty Loss 
Reserves, 2013”, developed by the Committee on Property and Liability Financial Reporting of the American 
Academy of Actuaries. A “qualified actuary” must meet specific, strict qualification requirements (see 
“Qualification Standards (including Continuing Education Requirements) for Actuaries Issuing Statements of 
Actuarial Opinion in the United States”, approved by the Board of Directors, American Academy of Actuaries, 
effective as of January 1, 2008).  
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provided by external consultant firms or employ in-house actuaries to determine the potential 
losses related to insurance policies (both new and existing) and hence the estimates of loss 
reserves (Cheng et al. 2015).  
Both practitioner and academic studies have discussed the effect of having in-house 
versus outside consultant actuaries on the level of reserve errors (e.g., NAIC 1992; Kelly, 
Kleffner, and Li 2012; Gaver and Paterson 2014). Equipped with both professional expertise 
in the subject matter and a better understanding of the insurer’s day-to-day operations, in-
house actuaries should be able to devise loss reserve estimates that accurately reflect the 
insurer’s expected value of unpaid losses. However, existing research suggests that in-house 
actuaries might lack independence because of their employment relationship with the insurer 
(Cheng et al. 2015), especially because actuaries often face high pressure from insurers’ top 
management vis-à-vis loss reserve estimation (Philbrick 2004): 
For the property/casualty industry, a major goal is accurate loss reserves. … However, 
we must recognize that there are considerable pressures working to prevent us from 
achieving the goal of accurate reserves. Meeting earnings projections often entails its 
own set of powerful incentives, which may be weighted toward short-term results. 
This often exerts a powerful downward pressure on reserves, but the direction is not 
always the same. … The IRS also exerts pressure, usually downward. …In short, the 
selection of a reserve number involves considerable pressure that may not be counter-
balanced by sufficient incentives to book the best possible number. 
Outside of the PC insurance industry, the accounting literature has suggested that 
firms with a more prominent general counsel or a better in-house tax department are more 
aggressive in pursuing tax avoidance strategies (Abernathy, Kubick, and Masli 2016; Chen et 
al. 2018). Comparing the tax aggressiveness of firms that employ different tax preparers, 
Klassen, Lisowsky, and Mescall (2016) find that firms that rely on internal tax departments 
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are the most tax aggressive. Klassen et al. (2016) explain that the results are consistent with 
the greater reputation concerns of external tax preparers that sign off on the tax returns of 
firms with aggressive tax positions.  
Judging from the above arguments, we expect that in-house actuaries will be more 
likely to suffer from impaired independence; hence, the estimates of loss provisions are 
subject to more biases when the insurer uses an in-house actuary. To the extent that tax 
considerations are important in insurers’ loss provision decisions (Gaver and Paterson 1999; 
Penalva 1998), we expect that firms with in-house actuaries will tend to overprovision for 
loss ex ante. However, in the alternative case that financial reporting incentives are stronger 
for our sample firms, insurers with in-house actuaries may under-provision for loss ex ante. 
This suggests that further identification could be achieved if we could separate firms that 
have stronger tax or financial reporting incentives in exploring the role of in-house actuaries 
in the effect of SSAP 101 on loss provisions. Following our earlier discussion, we consider 
private (public) insurers to have relatively stronger tax (financial reporting) incentives for this 
analysis. Hence, our sixth hypothesis is conditioned on private insurers:  
H6: The decrease in loss provisions following SSAP 101 adoption is larger for 
                    private insurers with in-house actuaries. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1  Sample Selection 
The main data sources for this research are Best’s Insurance Reports, 
Property/Casualty Editions, Best’s Key Rating Guide,13 the NAIC annual statement database, 
and the proxy statements of public insurers. The loss reserves are determined from Schedule 
P, Part 2 of insurers’ annual statements. We define company ownership structures using the 
                                                            
13 Best’s Insurance Reports, Property/Casualty, and Best’s Key Rating Guide are all published annually by the 
A. M. Best Company in Oldwick, New Jersey. 
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above database and cross-check the companies’ websites and news sources on the internet. 
We categorize mutuals and closely held stocks as private insurers. Following Cheng, 
Cummins, and Lin (2017, 2018), a mutual firm is defined as a family-controlled firm if the 
information from the “Management” section of Best’s Insurance Reports explicitly indicates 
it or if more than one member of the same family is present on the board. A private firm is 
defined as a family firm if the information from the “Management” section of Best’s 
Insurance Reports gives explicit, detailed information about family ownership. A publicly 
traded insurance company is classified as a family firm if more than 5% of the firm’s shares 
are owned by the family, following Anderson and Reeb (2003). Actuary information is hand 
collected from Best’s Insurance Reports, and this information is cross-checked with 
information in the insurer’s annual statement. Data indicating whether a state has stringent 
regulations are obtained from the NAIC’s Compendium of State Laws and Regulations on 
Insurance Topics. All other remaining variables are obtained from the NAIC annual 
statement database. 
The sample period is between 2009 and 2014, the years surrounding the adoption of 
SSAP 101 in 2011. We require firms to be incorporated in the U.S. and to be headquartered 
in one of the 50 states or the District of Columbia. Firms incorporated or headquartered 
outside the U.S. are subject to less IRS scrutiny since a greater proportion of their operations 
is located abroad; we hence exclude them from our analysis. We also limit our sample to C-
corporations because the IRS enforcement data apply only to these firms. In other words, we 
include only stocks and mutuals (and reciprocals) in our sample.14 Finally, data requirements 
for our control variables and loss reserve measures further limit the sample. Our full sample 
consists of 6,610 firm-year observations. 
3.2  Research Design 
                                                            
14 Cheng et al. (2017, 2018) suggest that modern reciprocals are virtually indistinguishable from mutuals. 
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To examine our predictions regarding the relation between SSAP 101 and loss 
reserves, we construct a firm-year panel and employ a difference-in-differences specification 
of Equation (1) as follows: 
 
 LOSS_RES_CYit = α0 + α1POST_SSAP101t + α2EXPOSUREit–1  
+ α3POST_SSAP101t×EXPOSUREit–1 + ΣαiCONTROLSit + µt + 𝜀it,           (1) 
 
where LOSS_RES_CYit is the current accident year loss reserves for insurer i in year t. 
POST_SSAP101t is an indicator variable that equals one for observations in the post-SSAP 
101 period (i.e., in or after 2012) and zero otherwise. EXPOSUREit–1 represents an insurer’s 
ex ante exposure to SSAP 101, which constitutes the treatment in our specification. Note that 
this variable is measured in year t–1. Our main variable of interest is the coefficient (α3) on 
the interaction term POST_SSAP101t×EXPOSUREit–1, which captures the differential change 
in our outcome variable (LOSS_RES_CYit) following the adoption of SSAP 101 between PC 
insurers with predictably smaller or larger exposure to this new standard of accounting for 
income taxes. For example, a negative value of the coefficient (α3) would indicate that 
compared to PC insurers with smaller ex ante exposure, PC insurers with larger ex ante 
exposure to SSAP 101 subsequently decrease their loss provisions to a larger extent after the 
regulation’s adoption.  
We also include year fixed effects (µt ) to capture any common trends in loss 
provisions during our sample period. Effectively, POST_SSAP101t will be absorbed by the 
year fixed effects; hence, our estimating equation is: 
  
 LOSS_RES_CYit = α0 + α1 EXPOSUREit–1 + α2POST_SSAP101t×EXPOSUREit–1  
      + ΣαiCONTROLSit + µt  + 𝜀it.                                                       (2) 
 
Our identification assumption is that PC insurers did not determine EXPOSURE prior 
to adoption of SSAP 101 based on the expectation of this new standard. This assumption is 
reasonable in our setting because our exposure proxies are either exogenous to insurers’ 
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decisions (IRS monitoring) or firm characteristics that are fairly time invariant or unlikely to 
change due to of SSAP 101 (i.e., private ownership, family ownership, and loss firm-years). 
As for the use of in-house actuaries, we do not have a strong reason to believe that firms 
changed their choice between in-house and external actuaries in anticipation of SSAP 101 
adoption.  
We omit the variable EXPOSURE to test H1, which examines whether PC insurers’ 
loss reserves decrease in the years after SSAP 101 without regard to insurers’ level of ex ante 
exposure to SSAP 101. We discuss the variable EXPOSURE in relation to H2-H6 below 
when we describe the results of the tests of these hypotheses.  
The dependent variable, LOSS_RES_CY, is the current accident year loss reserves. We 
use current accident year loss reserves because our primary interest lies in the effects of 
SSAP 101 on insurance companies’ tradeoffs between tax savings and earnings reported on 
the income statement for the current year. While insurers can apply discretion in revising 
prior years’ loss reserves, the possibility of the exercise of discretion is greatest for the 
current year loss provisions. In other words, the potential for manipulation of the loss 
reserves becomes considerably lower over time for a prior accident year(s) than it is for the 
initial estimate of the current accident year loss reserves. Insurers cannot manage paid claims, 
and more claims are paid each year for a prior accident year(s). We scale LOSS_RES_CY by 
total assets to control for variation in insurer size (Petroni 1992; Beaver, McNichols, and 
Nelson 2003; Grace and Leverty 2012).  
In Equation (1), we implement a difference-in-differences methodology. In particular, 
we rely on several identification assumptions that the effect of SSAP 101 is higher (or lower) 
for certain firms, as discussed above in our hypotheses.  
In Appendix 2, we illustrate the construction of the variable LOSS_RES_CY using 
Nationwide Mutual as an example. In calendar year 2011, the estimated losses during 
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accident year 2011 is $8,539.439 million (Panel A, Row 11, Column 11). In calendar year 
2011, Nationwide paid $5,293.916 million in losses associated with accidents that occurred in 
2011 (Panel B, Row 11, Column 11). Thus, of the estimated $8,539.439 million in losses that 
occurred during accident year 2011, 61.99% were paid in this year. The 2011 accident year 
loss reserves are $3,299.523 million (= $8,539.439 million – $5,293.916 million), which is 
the value of LOSS_RES_CY in 2011 for Nationwide. 
In terms of the empirical estimation of Equation (1), we follow Grace and Leverty 
(2012) and employ feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) with a panel-specific AR(1) 
autocorrelation structure.15 Beaver and McNichols (1998) report positive serial correlations in 
reserve errors, indicating multi-period reserve management. This estimation is appropriate for 
the empirical modeling of insurers’ loss provisions, which exhibit strong autocorrelation 
(Wooldridge 2002). In addition, we include year fixed effects to control for exogenous 
economic factors related to loss provisions that change over time and are not otherwise 
controlled for in the model.16  
We include a number of control variables that prior research finds are related to 
changes in loss reserves. Following Grace and Leverty (2010, 2012) and Beaver et al. (2003), 
three indicator variables (LOSS, SMALL PROFIT, and SMALL LOSS) are created to identify 
firms’ reported earnings. The LOSS indicator variable equals one for insurers with earnings in 
the top 90% of the negative earnings distribution and zero otherwise. The SMALL PROFIT 
(SMALL LOSS) indicator variable is set to one for insurers with reported earnings in the first 
5% of the distribution to the right (left) of zero and zero otherwise. 
                                                            
15 The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test suggests that fixed/random effects models are preferred to a 
pooled cross-sectional model. The Hausman test indicates that fixed effects are preferred to random effects 
models. The modified Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that there is no groupwise heteroscedasticity 
(p<0.0001). 
16 Exogenous economic factors include unexpected inflation, regulatory changes, changes in court attitudes, and 
jury verdicts that are outside of management control (Petroni 1992). Gaver, Paterson, and Pacini (2012) 
document that the PC industry as a whole over-reserved from 1993 to 1997, under-reserved from 1998 to 2002, 
and returned to over-reserving from 2003 to 2004. 
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Long-tail business (TAIL) indicates that large loss reserves are needed to cover future 
loss payments. Thus, we expect a positive coefficient on the variable TAIL, which is defined 
as one minus the ratio of cash already paid this year for the current year’s business to the 
estimation of loss incurred in the current year’s business (Petroni et al. 2000; Petroni and 
Beasley 1996; Gaver and Paterson 2001).  
We control for the impact of state rate regulation on insurers’ loss provisions 
(RATE_REGULATION). Nelson (2000) hypothesizes that insurers are interested in 
convincing regulators that they can charge low rates, so insurers have an incentive to 
understate reserves. Grace and Leverty (2010) instead suggest that insurers have an incentive 
to overestimate loss reserves in an attempt to convince regulators that the regulated price is 
too low. Thus, we have no priors for the coefficient on RATE_REGULATION.  
To measure the exposure to rate regulation for each insurer, we adopt the rate 
regulation variable used in Grace and Leverty (2010): 
 
   RATE_REGULATIONi,t = ∑ Premiums Writteni,s,t,l×Stringent Regulation Laws,t,l ,              (3) 
                         ∑ Premiums Writteni,s,t,l 
 
where i indicates firm i, s indicates state s, l indicates line l, and t indicates year t. This 
variable calculates the percentage of total premiums written subject to stringent state 
regulations for each firm. A state is considered to have a stringent rate regulatory law if it has 
state-made rates, a prior approval law, or a file and use law that requires the insurer file for 
prior approval if it wants to charge a rate that deviates from that filed by a rate advisory 
organization (Harrington 2002; Grace and Leverty 2010). States with file and use, use or file, 
filing only, or flex rating (with a large rating band) are considered not stringently regulated.  
Furthermore, the different lines of business operated by the insurers have significant 
impacts on their loss provisions. We classify all lines of business into personal lines 
(NPW_PERSONAL), commercial long-tail business lines (NPW_COMMERCIAL) and 
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commercial short-tail business lines (Cheng et al. 2017). Commercial long-tail business lines 
are considered the most complex type of PC insurance and personal lines the least (Regan 
1997). We have no priors for the signs of these variables in the regressions. 
Other control variables include insurer size (SIZE), reinsurance usage 
(REINSURANCE), net premium written growth (NPW_GROWTH), product line and 
geographic Herfindahl indices (HERFINDAHL_LINE; HERFINDAHL_STATE), and group 
ownership (GROUP_AFFILIATION) (Grace and Leverty 2010, 2012). SIZE is estimated as 
the logarithm of net premiums written. Harrington and Danzon (1994) indicate that 
reinsurance usage and growth are related to under-reserving. REINSURANCE is measured as 
the percentage of gross premiums written ceded to reinsurers. NPW_GROWTH is measured 
as the percentage increase in net premiums written from the previous to the current year. 
Insurers ceding more business should have smaller loss reserves if reinsurers are expected to 
cover a significant part of the losses. Additionally, financially weak firms tend to hide their 
financial condition through reinsurance (Harrington and Danzon 1994). They are also 
expected to under-report loss reserves to increase firm growth, suggesting that the coefficient 
on growth is negative. Therefore, reinsurance usage and firm growth should be negatively 
related to loss reserves.  
HERFINDAHL_LINE is measured as the sum of the squared percentage of premiums 
earned in each of the lines written by the PC insurer, while HERFINDAHL_STATE is 
measured using the sum of the squared percentage of business written in each of the 50 states 
and the District of Columbia by the insurer (Cheng et al. 2017). We control for the product 
line and geographic Herfindahl indices because the nature of the insurer’s business structure 
might affect its loss provisions, though we do not have any ex ante predictions regarding 
whether the effect is positive or negative. GROUP_AFFILIATION is an indicator variable 
equal to one for insurers associated with a group and zero otherwise. We control for group 
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affiliation because it is associated with intragroup reinsurance, which could decrease the need 
for a significant amount of loss reserves. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics. Panel A shows the mean and related statistics 
for the full sample of insurers. The table indicates that the mean current accident year loss 
reserves are approximately 10% of total assets. Approximately 68% of the sample consists of 
mutual or closely held stock insurers, and the remaining 32% are public insurers. Family 
control exists in approximately 36% of insurers, consistent with Cheng et al. (2017, 2018). 
Approximately 31% of insurers use internal actuaries to certify their loss reserve estimations.  
Panel B of Table 1 reports the means and medians for the samples of insurers before 
and after SSAP 1101. Both the mean and median current accident year loss reserves 
(LOSS_RES_CY) are significantly higher before SSAP 101. This univariate result provides 
preliminary support for our prediction in H1. The mean proportions of loss firms (LOSS) and 
firms reporting small profits (SMALL_PROFITS) are both higher in the pre-SSAP 101 years, 
whereas both net premium written growth (NPW_GROWTH) and the product line Herfindahl 
index (HERFINDAHL_LINE) are higher in the post-SSAP 101 period.  
[Please insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 reports the pairwise correlations among the major variables. In particular, the 
negative and significant correlation between current accident year loss reserves 
(LOSS_RES_CY) and the post-event indicator (POST_SSAP101) mirrors the univariate results 
discussed above, providing preliminary support for H1. 
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
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We now move on to regression tests of our various hypotheses. As a quick recap, the 
first six hypotheses relate to the relation between SSAP 101 adoption and insurers’ loss 
provisions, as well as the cross-sectional variations in this relation. To conduct the regression 
tests, we rely on the regression specification indicated in Equation (2). 
4.2  Test of H1 
H1 predicts that PC insurers’ loss provisions will decrease after the adoption of SSAP 
101 because of the tightened guidance and disclosure requirements for insurance companies’ 
income tax accounting. Column (1) of Table 3 presents the results of the test of H1. The 
coefficient on POST_SSAP101 is significantly negative (-0.005; p<0.01) after we control for 
year fixed effects and other factors affecting PC insurers’ loss reserves. This result is 
consistent with the univariate results above and our prediction that PC insurers’ loss reserves 
will decrease following SSAP 101 adoption. The coefficient estimate indicates that PC 
insurers on average reduce loss provisions by an economically significant amount of 
approximately 0.5% of their total admitted assets, or a tax saving of approximately $1.5 
million for the average PC insurer at a statutory tax rate of 35%.  
In terms of control variables, our results show that many of them are significantly 
related to current year loss reserves in a way that is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Nelson 
2000; Harrington 2002; Grace and Leverty 2010, 2012; Cheng et al. 2017, 2018). For 
example, we find that private insurers (PRIVATE) have larger loss provisions than public 
insurers do, consistent with prior research suggesting that private insurers have less 
immediate resources for capital and have to rely on loss provisions to cover potential 
surprises in future claims (Cheng et al. 2015). LOSS, SMALL_LOSS, and SMALL_PROFITS 
are all positively associated with loss provisions, consistent with loss firms or firms with 
small losses or small profits tending to have larger loss provisions than profit firms (Grace 
and Leverty 2010, 2012). TAIL carries a positive and significant coefficient, consistent with 
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our expectation that insurers with long-tail lines tend to have larger loss provisions to cover 
future claim payments (Petroni et al. 2000; Petroni and Beasley 1996; Beaver et al. 2003; 
Gaver and Paterson 2001). The coefficient on RATE_REGULATION is positively and 
significantly related to LOSS_RES_CY, suggesting that insurers have an incentive to increase 
loss provisions to convince regulators that the regulated price is too low, a result consistent 
with those in Grace and Leverty (2010, 2012). Firm size is positively related to 
LOSS_RES_CY. Larger firms have higher loss provisions (Grace and Leverty 2010, 2012; 
Cheng et al. 2015). The coefficients on HERFINDAHL_LINE, NPW_PERSONAL, and 
NPW_COMMERCIAL are all positively significant, consistent with firms with more business 
in personal lines (such as personal auto liability and homeowner liability) and commercial 
long-tail businesses having larger loss provisions. These findings also support the fact that 
insurers with more complex businesses increase their loss provisions for conservative 
reasons. Consistent with Grace and Leverty (2010), we find that REINSURANCE is 
negatively related to loss provisions, suggesting that insurers purchase reinsurance as a 
substitute for loss provisions. Also consistent with Grace and Leverty (2010, 2012), higher 
premium growth (NPW_GROWTH) is associated with lower loss provisions. The coefficient 
on GROUP_AFFILIATION is negative, consistent with the potentially lower need for large 
loss provisions for group-affiliated insurers, which are associated with intragroup reinsurance 
(Grace and Leverty 2010). Finally, family ownership is associated with higher loss 
provisions, consistent with the argument that family firms are more reputation sensitive and 
more conservative in financial reporting (Chen, Chen, and Cheng 2014). 
In sum, our results indicate that PC insurers significantly decrease loss provisions 
after the adoption of SSAP 101, consistent with our prediction in hypothesis H1 that the new 
accounting standard for income taxes will constrain PC insurers’ incentives to establish loss 
provisions for tax avoidance purposes.  
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4.3  Test of H2 
We are interested in determining whether SSAP 101 adoption-constrained tax-
motivated loss provisioning behaviors are more pronounced for PC insurers that have 
stronger exposure to the new standard. In particular, our hypothesis H2 predicts that the 
decrease in loss provisions following SSAP 101 adoption is larger for insurers subject to 
greater IRS monitoring. SSAP 101 is expected to give the tax authority a better information 
advantage over PC insurers’ tax positions, so insurers that ex ante face greater IRS 
monitoring are likely to be affected by the new standard to a greater extent.  
Our empirical proxy for IRS monitoring is the probability that the insurer is subject to 
an IRS audit in the year prior to SSAP 101 adoption (IRS_AUDIT). IRS_AUDIT is calculated 
as the number of corporate tax return audits completed in the IRS’s current fiscal year for an 
IRS asset size group, divided by the number of corporate tax returns received in the previous 
calendar year for the same IRS asset size group (Hoopes et al. 2012).17  These data are 
obtained from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), a non-profit entity 
that uses Freedom of Information Act requests and lawsuits to access information directly 
from the IRS. The IRS maintains records of audits completed and returns received for every 
IRS district by firm size (based on total assets) each year. Therefore, the variation in audit 
probability is induced by firm size, location, and fiscal year. In the regression, IRS AUDIT is 
measured using data from 2011, the year prior to SSAP 101 adoption, to address potential 
endogeneity. 
Before we discuss the regression results, we check whether this assumption is 
satisfied by visualizing the dynamics of our dependent variable LOSS_RES_CY over our 
sample period from 2009 to 2014. This is important because our research design builds on the 
assumption that the treatment and control groups do not show a clear trend in LOSS_RES_CY 
                                                            
17 We thank Jeff Hoopes for kindly sharing with us the data for IRS audit probability. 
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before SSAP 101 adoption. Figure 1 plots the annual mean values of PC insurers’ loss 
reserves for the current year, for firms with above- and below-median IRS audit probability, 
surrounding SSAP 101 adoption between 2009 and 2014. As shown in Figure 1, there is no 
clear trend between the two groups until 2012, the year when SSAP 101 became effective, 
after which the loss provisions of both groups start to decrease, providing evidence that the 
parallel trend assumption is not violated for our difference-in-differences research design. It 
is also observed from the plot that the decreases in loss reserves from 2011 to subsequent 
years are more significant for insurers with a higher IRS audit probability, providing 
preliminary support for hypothesis H2. 
The results of the test of H2 are presented in Column (2) of Table 3. The results show 
that the coefficient on the interaction term POST_SSAP101×IRS_AUDIT is significantly 
negative (-0.013; p<0.01), consistent with our prediction that the decrease in loss provisions 
following SSAP 101 adoption will be larger for insurers subject to greater IRS monitoring. 
This incremental effect of IRS monitoring is of economic significance. For an average 
insurer, moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of IRS_AUDIT is associated with an 
incremental reduction in loss provisions of 0.92% of total admitted assets.18 The overall 
effect of SSAP 101 on loss provisions remains significant (-0.003; p<0.01), accounting for an 
approximately 3% reduction in loss provisions post-SSAP 101. The results on the control 
variables are similar to those reported earlier. These findings provide support for hypothesis 
H2, that PC insurers that face higher IRS monitoring have greater decreases in loss reserves 
after SSAP 101 adoption. 
[Please insert Table 3 about here] 
  
                                                            
18 [(0.206 – 0.133)×( –0.013)]/0.103×100% = 0.92%. 
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4.4  Robustness Tests 
For robustness, we examine whether our results are sensitive to alternative estimation 
methods, an alternative proxy for loss reserves, and alternative definitions of EXPOSURE.  
In Panel A of Table 4, we document the robustness of our results to different 
estimations. Recall that our main estimation method uses the framework of feasible FGLS 
with a panel-specific AR(1) autocorrelation structure, following Grace and Leverty (2012). 
To ensure that our results are not sensitive to the choice of estimation method, we employ 
OLS as an alternative estimation method. As Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4, Panel A show, 
our results are robust to OLS estimation. As a further robustness test, we include firm fixed 
effects to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level. As shown in 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4, Panel A, our results are robust to the inclusion of firm fixed 
effects. These results reinforce our main finding that SSAP 101 adoption decreases PC 
insurers’ loss provisions using the FGLS approach. 
In Panel B of Table 4, we document the robustness of our results using an alternative 
dependent variable: total loss reserves (LOSS_RES_TOTAL). The primary difference between 
LOSS_RES_TOTAL and our main measure of current year loss reserves (LOSS_RES_CY) is 
that the former is a balance sheet item and the latter an income statement item. In addition to 
the annual loss provisions established for a given year, the total loss reserves in a given year 
for a PC insurer also provide a basis for the IRS to gauge and evaluate the appropriateness of 
the associated tax positions. Therefore, we expect that PC insurers will avoid IRS scrutiny by 
also lowering the amount of total loss reserves after SSAP 101, particularly for those that face 
greater IRS monitoring. As the results show, the effect of SSAP 101 adoption has a similar 
negative effect on insurers’ total loss reserves, and the effect is more negative for insurers 
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with greater IRS monitoring. 19  
In Panel C of Table 4, we document the robustness of our results using two alternative 
measures of IRS monitoring. First, to address the potential concern that the variable 
IRS_AUDIT, our main measure of insurers’ exposure to SSAP 101, could be driven by 
insurers’ firm size (total assets), we create a new variable of size- and time-adjusted IRS audit 
probability. Specifically, using the audit probability data, we create IRS_AUDIT_SIZE_ADJ, 
which is the residuals from a regression of audit probability on asset size and year. We re-
estimate Equation (2) using the residuals from the year 2011 to measure insurers’ exposure to 
SSAP 101 due to IRS monitoring. The results using IRS_AUDIT_SIZE_ADJ as an alternative 
proxy for IRS monitoring are reported in Column (1) of Table 4’s Panel C. In particular, the 
coefficient on the interaction term POST_SSAP101×IRS_MONITORING is significantly 
negative (-0.001; p<0.05), consistent with our earlier findings using the unadjusted 
IRS_AUDIT proxy. This finding also suggests that insurer size does not drive our results. To 
provide additional confirmation, we employ a second alternative proxy capturing IRS 
enforcement activities introduced by Bozanic, Hoopes, Thornock, and Williams (2016). 
Bozanic et al. (2016) construct a measure, labeled IRS attention, using the number of 
downloads the IRS makes of a firm’s annual financial reports from EDGAR. In our 
regression, we define a new variable, IRS_ATTENTION, as PC insurers ranked in the top 
decile by the IRS’s annual report downloads in 2011. Note that this variable is defined for 
public insurers only. We re-estimate Equation (2) using IRS_ATTENTION as a second 
alternative proxy for IRS monitoring and report the results in Column (2) of Table 4’s Panel 
C. The coefficient on the interaction term POST_SSAP101×IRS_MONITORING is negative 
and significant (-0.004; p<0.05), providing further evidence in support of hypothesis H2 
using an alternative measure of IRS monitoring.  
                                                            
19 The sample size is larger in the test using the total loss reserve measure because there are fewer missing 
values for this measure in the database. The results are similar when we restrict the test to the same sample. 
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Taken together, the results from our series of robustness tests provide strong support for 
the robustness of our main finding that SSAP 101 adoption decreases PC insurers’ loss 
provisions, particularly for those with stronger exposure to SSAP 101 (i.e., facing greater IRS 
scrutiny).  
 [Please insert Table 4 about here] 
4.5  Tests of H3, H4, and H5 
Our next cross-sectional test examines whether PC insurers that have weaker tax 
incentives ex ante experience decreased loss reserves after SSAP 101 adoption. As discussed 
above, we rely on three firm-level characteristics to capture insurers’ ex ante tax incentives: 
private ownership, family ownership, and loss firms.  
H3 predicts that SSAP 101 adoption has a milder effect on public firms because they 
are also less likely to overstate loss provisions for tax purposes if they are under greater 
public scrutiny and capital market pressure. Column (1) of Table 5 presents the results. Our 
variable of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term POST_SSAP101×PRIVATE, 
which is negative and significant at the 1% level (-0.002; p<0.01). These results are 
consistent with our prediction that the decrease in loss provisions following SSAP 101 will be 
incrementally larger for private insurers, rejecting the null of H3. The size of the difference is 
of economic significance: the magnitudes of the coefficients indicate that the economic effect 
of SSAP 101 on private insurers [-0.004 + (-0.002) = -0.006] is approximately 1.5-fold what 
it is on public insurers (-0.004). It is important to note that the effect of SSAP 101 on public 
insurers, despite being smaller, is also significant (-0.004; p<0.01). Overall, our findings 
suggest that SSAP 101 adoption has a significant impact on reducing the loss provisions of 
both private and public PC insurers, with private insurers experiencing a much stronger 
effect.  
Column (2) of Table 5 tabulates the results of the cross-sectional test regarding family 
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insurers. The result on the interaction term POST_SSAP101×FAMILY is significantly positive 
(0.005; p<0.01), supporting our prediction that the loss reserve estimations of family-owned 
insurers will be less impacted by SSAP 101. 
The results of the cross-sectional test regarding loss firms are presented in Column (3) 
of Table 5. The coefficient on the interaction term POST_SSAP101×LOSS is significantly 
positive, consistent with H4’s prediction that the loss provisions of loss firms will be 
significantly less affected by SSAP 101 adoption. 
Overall, the results are consistent with our expectation that the loss provisions of PC 
insurers are less affected by SSAP 101 adoption when they have a weak ex ante incentive to 
over-reserve for tax benefits. These results, together with those presented earlier for 
hypotheses H1 and H2, provide consistent and convincing support for our main prediction 
that SSAP 101 will decrease PC insurers’ loss provisions by constraining their incentives to 
establish loss reserves for tax purposes.  
[Please insert Table 5 about here] 
4.6  Tests of H6 
Hypothesis H6 examines on how in-house actuaries moderate the effect of SSAP 101 
on loss provisions for insurers. To the extent that in-house actuaries are more likely to suffer 
from impaired independence, the estimates of loss provisions are subject to more biases when 
the insurer used an in-house actuary prior to SSAP 101. Hence, we expect the effect of SSAP 
101 on reducing loan loss provisions to be even greater for firms using in-house actuaries 
before 2011. 
Following Cheng et al. (2015), we create a variable, INHOUSE_ACTUARY, which is 
an indicator that equals one if the insurer uses an actuary who is an employee of the firm to 
certify the accuracy of the loss reserves in financial statements submitted to regulators; 
otherwise, the indicator equals zero. In some cases, insurers still use their in-house actuaries 
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to prepare financial statements but rely on external independent actuaries, e.g., actuaries at 
consulting firms or Big 4 auditors, to certify loss reserves in the annual financial reports 
submitted to regulators. In this case, we define these firms as using independent actuaries to 
certify loss reserves. 
In Column (1) of Table 6, the results show that the main effect of 
INHOUSE_ACTUARY is negative and significant, suggesting that PC insurers with in-house 
actuaries have small loss reserves on average. The interaction effect 
(POST_SSAP101×INHOUSE_ACTUARY) is negative and significant (-0.001, p<0.01), 
suggesting that the decrease in loss provisions following SSAP 101 adoption is larger for 
insurers with in-house actuaries.  
More interestingly, when we conduct the estimation separately using the private firm-
only and public firm-only samples, we find that the main effect of INHOUSE_ACTUARY is 
not significant in the private insurer sample (Column (2)), but it is significantly negative in 
the public insurer sample (Column (3)). These results are consistent with our expectation that 
the bias of in-house actuaries will differ between private and public insurers such that those 
with public insurers tend to bias their loss reserve estimates downward for a higher net 
income number. In contrast, those in private firms are less likely to under-reserve because 
private insurers are under less capital market pressure. Finally, the results indicate that the 
interaction effect of POST_SSAP101×INHOUSE_ACTUARY is significantly negative among 
private insurers, but it is not significantly different from zero among public insurers. These 
results support our prediction that for private insurers, the negative effect of SSAP 101 
adoption on loss provisions will be significantly stronger for firms with in-house actuaries to 
certify the accuracy of an insurer’s loss reserves. 
[Please insert Table 6 about here] 
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In addition, we expect that the direction of the bias differences will depend on 
whether the insurer is a public or private firm. Specifically, due to capital market pressure, 
managers of public insurers are more likely to have their in-house actuaries certify lower loss 
reserve estimates, leading to higher earnings. In contrast, subject to lower capital market 
pressure, managers of private insurers are more likely to pressure their in-house actuaries to 
provide higher loss reserves to increase tax shields. This leads to the following prediction of 
an interaction effect: for public insurers, having in-house actuaries does not significantly 
change the effect of SSAP 101 on loss provisions; however, for private insurers, the negative 
effect of SSAP 101 adoption on loss provisions is significantly stronger for firms with in-
house actuaries. 
 
5. Additional Tests 
5.1 Consequences of Improved Loss Provision Estimates 
Collectively, the results presented so far offer strong support for our prediction that 
SSAP 101 reduces PC insurers’ incentives to establish reserves for tax purposes. To examine 
the broader implications of the effect of SSAP 101 on PC insurers, we conduct additional 
analyses to explore whether the enhanced quality of the loss reserve estimate improves the 
quality of earnings and overall risk of PC insurers.  
Biases in loss reserve estimates can distort the true financial conditions of insurance 
firms, which play an important role in the financial sector and the overall health of the 
economy. To investigate the broader economic consequences of SSAP 101, we examine its 
effects on PC insurers’ earnings quality and overall firm risk. A loss reserve estimate that 
better reflects the true underlying economics of the insurer implies higher-quality earnings 
and regulatory capital. As such, we predict that SSAP 101 adoption will enhance the quality 
of earnings and the overall risk for PC insurers. The results of these tests could improve our 
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understanding of how accounting standards shape insurers’ tax reporting behaviors, corporate 
transparency, and firm risk and they should be of interest to accounting standard setters, tax 
authorities, and policy makers.  
In testing the effect of SSAP 101 on earnings persistence, we estimate Equation (4) 
using OLS below:  
NIit+1 = α0 + α1POST_SSAP101t×EXPOSUREit–1×NIit  
 
                  + α2 POST_SSAP101t×EXPOSUREit–1 + α3 EXPOSUREit–1×NIit   
 
                   + α4 POST_SSAP101t×NIit  + α5POST_SSAP101t  + α6EXPOSUREit–1 + α7NIit              
             + ΣαiCONTROLSit + µt  + 𝜀it,                                                                        (4)  
 
where net income (NI) is our primary earnings measure. We also employ net income before 
taxes (NIBT) and net income before dividends and taxes (NIBDT) as alternative earnings 
proxies. Consistent with our earlier analysis, we employ IRS monitoring (IRS_AUDIT) as our 
primary exposure proxy and use insurers’ private ownership (PRIVATE) as an alternative 
exposure proxy. Our variable of interest in Equation (4) is the three-way interaction term 
POST_SSAP101×EXPOSURE×NI, the coefficient on which captures the effect of SSAP 101 
adoption on the association between current and next year’s earnings for firms that have 
larger exposure to SSAP 101. 
In assessing the effect on insurers’ overall risk, we estimate Equation (5) using OLS 
as follows: 
ROA_VOLATILITYit = α0 + α1POST_SSAP101t×EXPOSUREit–1 + α2POST_SSAP101t  
 
                                                     + α3EXPOSUREit–1 + ΣαiCONTROLSit + µt  + 𝜀it,                              (5) 
 
where ROA_VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of the insurer’s ROA, our measure of 
their overall risk. Similarly, we use IRS monitoring (IRS_AUDIT) and insurers’ private 
ownership (PRIVATE) as two proxies for insurers’ ex ante exposure to SSAP 101. In 
Equation (5), we are interested in the coefficient on the interaction term 
POST_SSAP101×EXPOSURE, which captures the effect of SSAP 101 adoption on the 
overall risk of insurers with particularly strong exposure to SSAP 101. 
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Table 7 reports the results of the earnings persistence tests using Equation (4), with 
Panel A showing results using IRS_AUDIT as the exposure measure and Panel B showing 
results using PRIVATE as the exposure proxy. Across all specifications in Panel A, the 
coefficients on the three-way interaction term POST_SSAP101×IRS_AUDIT×NI are 
significantly positive, suggesting a significant increase in earnings persistence after SSAP 
101 adoption among firms facing higher IRS monitoring. Using insurers’ private ownership 
as an alternative exposure proxy, we again document similar results that are consistent across 
all three earnings measures. In sum, our results provide consistent evidence suggesting that 
SSAP 101 improves PC insurers’ earnings persistence among insurers that have stronger 
exposure to the new standard.  
[Please insert Table 7 about here] 
 Table 8 reports the results of ROA volatility tests using Equation (5). In Column (1), 
we report the results of Equation (5) omitting the interaction term. The coefficient on 
POST_SSAP101 is significantly negative, suggesting a decrease in PC insurers’ overall risk 
after SSAP 101 adoption (-0.004; p<0.01). The economic effect is significant, representing a 
decrease in ROA volatility of over 17%. In terms of the incremental effect due to insurers’ 
heterogeneous exposure to SSAP 101, we find that insurers that are more exposed to the new 
standard experience a greater decrease in overall risk, as evidenced by the negative and 
significant coefficients on POST_SSAP101×IRS_AUDIT and POST_SSAP101×PRIVATE in 
Columns (2) and (3), respectively.  
In sum, we document strong evidence suggesting that private PC insurers exhibit 
higher earnings persistence and lower ROA volatility after SSAP 101 adoption, particularly 
for those with greater ex ante exposure to SSAP 101. Our findings are consistent with our 
prediction that the improved quality of the loss reserve estimate will enhance the quality of 
earnings and reduce the overall risk of PC insurance firms.  
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[Please insert Table 8 about here] 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines the effect of the adoption of a new accounting standard for the 
income taxes of PC insurance companies (SSAP 101) on the quality of their loss reserve 
estimates. Building on prior literature that suggests that insurers have incentives to establish 
loss reserves for tax purposes (Penalva 1998; Gaver and Paterson 1999), we predict and find 
that SSAP 101 adoption reduces insurance companies’ loss reserve provisions, particularly 
for insurers that have greater ex ante exposure to SSAP 101. Consistent with tax incentives 
being the main channel of the observed effect, we find that the reduction in loss provisions is 
significantly weaker for insurers that are less likely to over-reserve for tax purposes ex ante. 
We also find that earnings persistence improves and overall risk declines after SSAP 101 
adoption among insurers that are more affected by the new standard. Overall, our paper 
provides evidence of how accounting standards for income taxes can improve firms’ 
transparency, earnings quality, and overall risk profile by curbing their tax avoidance 
behavior. 
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Appendix 1 List of variables 
 
Variable Description/Construction Details 
  
LOSS_RES_CY Current accident year loss reserves, scaled by total admitted assets. 
  
POST_SSAP101 
 
An indicator for the post-implementation period of SSAP 101, equal 
to one for 2012 or after observations, and zero otherwise. 
  
PRIVATE An indicator equal to one if the insurer is private and zero otherwise. 
  
IRS_AUDIT 
 
 
  
IRS audit probability in 2011, a proxy for the IRS’s effort to monitor 
the insurer, calculated as the number of corporate tax return audits 
completed in IRS fiscal year 2011 (October 1 to September 30) 
divided by the number of corporate tax returns received in calendar 
year 2010. 
  
INHOUSE_ACTUARY An indicator equal to one if the insurer employs in-house actuaries 
and zero otherwise. 
  
LOSS 
 
An indicator variable equal to one if the insurer’s earnings are in the 
top 90% of the negative earnings distribution in year t and zero 
otherwise. 
  
FAMILY An indicator equal to one if the insurer is a family-owned insurer 
and zero otherwise. 
  
NI Net income. 
  
NIBDT Net income before dividends and taxes. 
  
ROA_VOLATILITY ROA volatility, measured by the standard deviation of the insurer’s 
ROA. 
  
SMALL_LOSS 
 
An indicator variable equal to one if the insurer’s earnings are in the 
top 5% of the negative earnings distribution in year t and zero 
otherwise. 
  
SMALL_PROFITS 
 
An indicator variable equal to one if the insurer’s earnings are in the 
bottom 5% of the positive earnings distribution in year t and zero 
otherwise. 
  
TAIL 
 
One minus the ratio of cash already paid this year for the current 
year’s business to the estimation of incurred loss in the current 
year’s business. 
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RATE_REGULATION Percentage of premiums written in a state with stringent rate 
regulation. 
  
SIZE  Natural logarithm of net premiums written. 
  
HERFINDAHL_LINE Herfindahl indices of premiums written by product line. 
  
HERFINDAHL_STATE Herfindahl indices of premiums written by state. 
  
NPW_PERSONAL 
 
 
Proportion of net premiums written (NPW) from personal lines (i.e., 
Farmowners Multiple Peril, Homeowners Multiple Peril, Personal 
Automobile Physical Damage, and Personal Automobile Liability) 
to total NPW. 
  
NPW_COMMERCIAL 
 
 
Proportion of net premiums written (NPW) from commercial long-
tail lines (i.e., Workers' Compensation, Other Liability, and 
Commercial Automobile Liability) to total NPW.  
  
REINSURANCE Percentage of gross premiums written that is ceded to reinsurers. 
  
NPW_GROWTH One-year percentage change in net premiums written. 
  
GROUP_AFFILIATION An indicator variable equal to one for insurers associated with a 
group and zero otherwise. 
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Appendix 2 Example of the calculation of current accident year loss reserves (LOSS_RES_CY) 
 
Panel A: Loss estimates reported at year end ($000) 
Calendar 
Year 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Accident 
Year 
Prior 3,285,875 3,410,600 3,524,213 3,637,263 3,587,121 3,623,562 3,685,809 3,714,597 3,739,139 3,746,374 
2002 5,972,319 5,928,093 5,976,433 5,980,533 5,956,761 5,944,897 5,938,278 5,932,815 5,924,491 5,933,300 
2003  6,341,971 6,172,137 6,162,098 6,115,388 6,101,180 6,097,493 6,090,287 6,090,476 6,085,835 
2004   6,473,471 6,413,553 6,339,425 6,341,557 6,309,336 6,284,525 6,269,843 6,263,201 
2005    6,943,086 6,791,488 6,794,457 6,798,872 6,770,778 6,758,415 6,745,659 
2006     7,073,917 7,017,149 7,020,017 6,984,007 6,944,226 6,919,259 
2007      7,465,502 7,507,457 7,404,207 7,339,228 7,297,571 
2008       8,456,304 8,518,540 8,419,513 8,342,704 
2009        8,005,030 7,766,655 7,682,848 
2010         7,701,817 7,588,385 
2011          8,539,439 
Column 
Total 9,258,194 15,680,664 22,146,254 29,136,533 35,864,100 43,288,304 51,813,566 59,704,786 66,953,803 75,144,575 
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Appendix 2 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Cumulative paid net losses reported at year end ($000) 
Calendar Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Accident Year           
Prior ---- 1,302,260 2,048,337 2,483,888 2,716,385 2,912,724 2,994,335 3,124,176 3,197,355 3,283,836 
2002 3,485,702 4,651,574 5,185,129 5,501,019 5,686,662 5,782,591 5,833,137 5,866,513 5,882,927 5,895,712 
2003  3,591,356 4,832,488 5,316,455 5,650,653 5,839,750 5,938,248 5,986,874 6,019,722 6,038,703 
2004   3,611,387 4,942,134 5,466,912 5,819,707 6,005,531 6,110,435 6,164,597 6,192,091 
2005    3,788,748 5,172,434 5,842,367 6,228,643 6,455,542 6,576,735 6,627,072 
2006     3,880,331 5,398,637 6,016,739 6,396,915 6,621,094 6,736,893 
2007      4,100,337 5,687,570 6,286,051 6,684,713 6,918,106 
2008       4,925,220 6,692,479 7,331,730 7,764,890 
2009        4,501,817 6,063,960 6,716,105 
2010         4,475,772 6,021,151 
2011          5,293,916 
Column 
Total 3,485,702 9,545,190 15,677,341 22,032,244 28,573,377 35,696,113 43,629,423 51,420,802 59,018,605 67,488,475 
This table is excerpted from the 2011 Annual Statement of Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company Schedule P: Part 2-Summary (Panel A) and Part 3-
Summary (Panel B). Panel A reports the amount of estimated losses for an accident year by the calendar year of evaluation as well as subsequent 
adjustments in the estimate as claims are settled over time. Panel B reports the cumulative paid net losses for an accident year by the calendar year of 
evaluation. 
 
Illustration of the calculations of the current accident year loss reserves: 
In calendar year 2011, the current accident year loss reserves (LOSS_RES_CY) are calculated as the difference between the estimated loss for accident 
year 2011 in 2011 (Cell 2011×2011 in Panel A: $8,539.439 million) and the cumulative paid net loss for accident year 2011 as of 2011 (Cell 
2011×2011 in Panel B: $5,293.916 million), or ($8,539.439 – 5,293.916) million = $3,299.523 million. 
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Figure 1: Trends in LOSS_RES_CY Surrounding SSAP 101 Adoption: High versus Low IRS Audit 
Probability – Full Sample 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics  
Panel A reports summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis for the full sample of 6,610 firm-year 
observations between 2009 and 2014. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 25th Median 75th 
      
LOSS_RES_CY 0.103 0.053 0.066 0.100 0.133 
POST_SSAP101 0.501 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
IRS AUDIT 0.188 0.089 0.133 0.174 0.206 
PRIVATE   0.682 0.466 0.000 1.000 1.000 
FAMILY   0.358 0.479 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LOSS   0.183 0.387 0.000 0.000 0.000 
INHOUSE_ACTUARY 0.306 0.461 0.000 0.000 1.000 
NI (millions) 30.67 285.0 0.181 2.603 12.80 
ROA_VOLATILITY 0.023 0.031 0.008 0.016 0.028 
SMALL_LOSS  0.006 0.078 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SMALL_PROFITS  0.026 0.161 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TAIL    0.546 0.232 0.359 0.539 0.727 
RATE_REGULATION 0.379 0.349 0.038 0.304 0.620 
SIZE 17,640 1,969 16,416 17,669 18,896 
HERFINDAHL_LINE 0.483 0.298 0.230 0.378 0.695 
HERFINDAHL_STATE 0.533 0.385 0.143 0.469 1.000 
NPW_PERSONAL 0.407 0.377 0.007 0.358 0.793 
NPW_COMMERCIAL 0.282 0.331 0.008 0.112 0.468 
REINSURANCE 0.373 0.285 0.125 0.313 0.591 
NPW_GROWTH 0.066 0.420 -0.039 0.030 0.099 
GROUP_AFFILIATION 0.733 0.442 0.000 1.000 1.000 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (continued) 
 
Panel B: Variable means and medians, pre and post SSAP 101 
Panel B reports the means and medians for the variables used in the pre- and post-SSAP 101 period analysis. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in the differences in the means 
(t-test) or medians (rank sum test). 
 Pre-SSAP 101 Post-SSAP 101 
     
Variable Mean 
N = 3,300 
Median 
N = 3,300 
Mean 
N = 3,310 
Median 
N = 3,310 
     
LOSS_RES_CY 0.104** 0.102*** 0.101 0.098 
IRS_AUDIT 0.187 0.174 0.189 0.174 
PRIVATE   0.671* 1.000* 0.692 1.000 
FAMILY   0.360 0.000 0.356 0.000 
LOSS   0.220*** 0.000*** 0.147 0.000 
INHOUSE_ACTUARY 0.315** 0.000 0.297 0.000 
NI (millions) 24.70*** 2.159*** 32.80 3.104 
ROA_VOLATILITY 0.025** 0.018** 0.022 0.013 
SMALL_LOSS  0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000 
SMALL_PROFITS  0.031** 0.000** 0.022 0.000 
TAIL    0.548 0.541 0.545 0.526 
RATE_REGULATION 0.378 0.306 0.380 0.302 
SIZE 17.61 17.65 17.67 17.67 
HERFINDAHL_LINE 0.476* 0.371** 0.489 0.389 
HERFINDAHL_STATE 0.528 0.458 0.537 0.480 
NPW_PERSONAL 0.406 0.367 0.409 0.358 
NPW_COMMERCIAL 0.277 0.117 0.286 0.108 
REINSURANCE 0.373 0.318 0.372 0.311 
NPW_GROWTH 0.041*** 0.009*** 0.092 0.048 
GROUP_AFFILIATION 0.732 1.000 0.734 1.000 
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Table 2: Correlations 
 
This table reports the pairwise correlations for the major variables used in the analysis. The correlations in boldface are significant at the  
0.10 level (based on two-tailed tests). See Appendix 1for variable definitions.  
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
          
(1)    LOSS_RES_CY -0.025 0.040 0.085 0.124 -0.031 0.193 0.202 0.090 0.328 
(2)    POST_SSAP101  0.023 -0.003 0.014 -0.019 -0.094 -0.006 0.003 0.017 
(3)    IRS_AUDIT   -0.165 -0.069 0.306 -0.135 0.212 0.049 0.793 
(4)    PRIVATE    -0.244 -0.338 0.134 -0.196 -0.106 0.233 
(5)    FAMILY      0.022 -0.067 0.015 0.092 -0.065 
(6)    LOSS      -0.114 -0.117 -0.000 -0.109 
(7)    INHOUSE_ACTUARY       -0.013 -0.028 0.325 
(8)    TAIL        0.050 0.046 
(9)    RATE_REGULATION         0.050 
(10)  SIZE           
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Table 3: The effect of SSAP 101 adoption on loss provisions 
 
This table reports the test results for the effect of SSAP 101 adoption on insurers’ loss provisions between 2009 and 
2014. Following Grace and Leverty (2012), we use feasible generalized least squares with a panel-specific AR(1) 
autocorrelation structure model in the estimation. A constant term is included but not reported. Please refer to 
Appendix 1 for variable definitions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: LOSS_RES_CY (1) (2) 
   
POST_SSAP101     -0.005***      -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
POST_SSAP101×IRS_AUDIT       -0.013*** 
  (0.003) 
IRS_AUDIT       -0.226*** 
  (0.005) 
PRIVATE       0.013*** 0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
LOSS       0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
SMALL_LOSS       0.006*** 0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
SMALL_PROFITS      0.008*** 0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
TAIL       0.091*** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
RATE_REGULATION       0.004*** 0.108*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
SIZE        0.008*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
HERFINDAHL_LINE       0.002*** 0.017*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
HERFINDAHL_STATE 0.000 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
NPW_PERSONAL       0.052*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
NPW_COMMERCIAL       0.029*** 0.053*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
REINSURANCE     -0.041*** 0.028*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
NPW_GROWTH     -0.002*** -0.033*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
GROUP_AFFILIATION     -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
FAMILY       0.012*** 0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
   
Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
N 6,610 6,610 
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Table 4: The effect of SSAP 101 adoption on loss provisions – Sensitivity analysis 
 
Panel A reports the test results for the effect of SSAP 101 adoption on insurers’ loss provisions between 2009 and 
2014 using OLS (with/without firm fixed effects). A constant term is included but not reported. Please refer to 
Appendix 1 for variable definitions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: OLS and the firm fixed effects model 
Dependent variable: LOSS_RES_CY (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
POST_SSAP101 -0.003** -0.003 -0.009*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
POST_SSAP101×IRS_AUDIT  -0.024**  -0.015*** 
  (0.010)  (0.005) 
IRS_AUDIT  -0.241***  -0.005 
  (0.022)  (0.020) 
PRIVATE 0.010*** 0.0090*** 0.014** 0.014** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) 
LOSS 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
SMALL_LOSS 0.006 0.0078 0.004 0.004 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) 
SMALL_PROFITS 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
TAIL 0.004 0.005 0.105*** 0.105*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) 
RATE_REGULATION 0.081*** 0.101*** 0.011** 0.011** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
SIZE  0.003 0.003 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
HERFINDAHL_LINE 0.009*** 0.018*** -0.016** -0.016** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) 
HERFINDAHL_STATE 0.004 0.005 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
NPW_PERSONAL -0.005 -0.004 0.016** 0.016** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) 
NPW_COMMERCIAL 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) 
REINSURANCE 0.033*** 0.028*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
NPW_GROWTH -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
GROUP_AFFILIATION -0.000 -0.004** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
FAMILY 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
Firm Fixed Effects - - Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included 
R2 0.36 0.41 0.91 0.91 
N 6,610 6,610 6,610 6,610 
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Table 4: The effect of SSAP 101 adoption on loss provisions – Sensitivity analysis (continued) 
 
Panel B reports the test results for the effect of SSAP 101 adoption on insurers’ loss provisions between 2009 and 
2014 using total loss reserves (LOSS_RES_TOTAL) as the dependent variable. Following Grace and Leverty (2012), 
we use feasible generalized least squares with a panel-specific AR(1) autocorrelation structure model in the 
estimation. A constant term is included but not reported. Please refer to Appendix 1 for variable definitions. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel B: Alternative proxy for loss reserves: Total loss reserves 
Dependent variable: LOSS_RES_TOTAL (1) (2) 
   
POST_SSAP101 -0.021*** -0.020*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
POST_SSAP101×IRS_AUDIT  -0.014*** 
  (0.005) 
IRS_AUDIT  -0.275*** 
  (0.009) 
PRIVATE -0.006*** -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
LOSS 0.028*** 0.033*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
SMALL_LOSS 0.012*** 0.015*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
SMALL_PROFITS 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
TAIL 0.241*** 0.281*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
RATE_REGULATION 0.035*** 0.021*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
SIZE  0.033*** 0.042*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
HERFINDAHL_LINE -0.041*** -0.032*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
HERFINDAHL_STATE 0.021*** 0.037*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
NPW_PERSONAL 0.030*** 0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
NPW_COMMERCIAL 0.145*** 0.118*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
REINSURANCE -0.055*** -0.046*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
NPW_GROWTH -0.023*** -0.028*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
GROUP_AFFILIATION -0.012*** -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
FAMILY 0.006*** 0.016*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
   
Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
N 9,059 9,059 
51 
 
Table 4: The effect of SSAP 101 adoption on loss provisions – Sensitivity analysis (continued)   
 
Panel C reports the test results for the effect of SSAP 101 adoption on insurers’ loss provisions between 2009 and 
2014 using two alternative proxies for IRS monitoring. Following Grace and Leverty (2012), we use feasible 
generalized least squares with a panel-specific AR(1) autocorrelation structure model in the estimation. A constant 
term is included but not reported. Please refer to Appendix 1 for variable definitions. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses below each coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel C: Alternative proxies for IRS monitoring 
Dependent variable: LOSS_RES_CY (1) (2) 
 IRS_AUDIT_ADJ IRS_ATTENTION 
   
POST_SSAP101 -0.003** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
POST_SSAP101×IRS_MONITORING  -0.001** -0.004** 
 (0.000) (0.002) 
IRS_MONITORING 0.014 -0.015*** 
 (0.021) (0.002) 
PRIVATE 0.014* - 
 (0.007) - 
LOSS 0.016*** 0.050*** 
 (0.001) -0.002  
SMALL_LOSS 0.004 (0.007) 
 (0.003) -0.011  
SMALL_PROFITS 0.006*** 0.001  
 (0.002) -0.002  
TAIL 0.004 0.079*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
RATE_REGULATION 0.103*** -0.012*** 
  (0.008) (0.002) 
SIZE  0.011* 0.012*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) 
HERFINDAHL_LINE 0.024*** 0.014*** 
 (0.003) -0.003  
HERFINDAHL_STATE -0.016* 0.008*** 
 (0.009) -0.002  
NPW_PERSONAL -0.002 0.060*** 
 (0.008) -0.003  
NPW_COMMERCIAL 0.017* 0.028*** 
 (0.009) (0.004) 
REINSURANCE 0.027*** -0.035*** 
 (0.010) (0.002) 
NPW_GROWTH -0.030*** -0.001  
 (0.006) (0.001) 
GROUP_AFFILIATION -0.003*** 0.023*** 
 (0.001) -0.006  
FAMILY 0.002 0.023*** 
 (0.006) -0.002  
   
Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
N 6,610 1,048 
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Table 5: The effect of SSAP 101 adoption on loss provisions – The ex ante tax aggressiveness of PC 
insurers 
 
This table reports the test results for the effect of SSAP 101 adoption on insurers’ loss provisions between 2009 and 
2014. Following Grace and Leverty (2012), we use feasible generalized least squares with a panel-specific AR(1) 
autocorrelation structure model in the estimation. Please refer to Appendix 1 for variable definitions. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
Dependent variable: LOSS_RES_CY (1) (2) (3) 
    
POST_SSAP101     -0.004***     -0.006***     -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
POST_SSAP101×PRIVATE     -0.002***   
 (0.000)   
POST_SSAP101×FAMILY        0.005***  
  (0.000)  
POST_SSAP101×LOSS        0.006*** 
   (0.001) 
PRIVATE      0.014***   
 (0.001)   
FAMILY        0.012***  
  (0.001)  
LOSS        0.016*** 
   (0.000) 
    
Control Variables Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
N 6,610 6,610 6,610 
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Table 6: The effect of SSAP 101 adoption on loss provisions – Potential in-house actuary bias 
 
This table reports the test results for the effect of SSAP 101 adoption on insurers’ loss provisions between 2009 and 
2014. Following Grace and Leverty (2012), we use feasible generalized least squares with a panel-specific AR(1) 
autocorrelation structure model in the estimation. Please refer to Appendix 1 for variable definitions. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
Dependent variable: LOSS_RES_CY (1) 
Full Sample 
(2) 
Private Only 
(3) 
Public Only 
    
POST_SSAP101      -0.004***      -0.004***      -0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
POST_SSAP101×INHOUSE_ACTUARY      -0.001***      -0.005*** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
INHOUSE_ACTUARY      -0.005*** 0.000      -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
    
Control Variables Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
N 6,552 4,448 2,104 
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Table 7: SSAP 101 adoption and the earnings persistence of insurance companies 
 
Panel A reports the test results for the effect of SSAP 101 adoption on insurers’ earnings persistence using IRS audit 
(IRS AUDIT) as the partitioning variable. Note that observations for the year of adoption of SSAP 101 (t = 2012) are 
dropped. For the period before SSAP 101 adoption, Earnings t+1 ends at the year 2012, with Earnings t as the year 
2011. For the period after SSAP 101 adoption, Earnings t begins with 2013 and Earnings t+1 is 2014. A constant 
term is included but not reported. Please refer to Appendix 1 for variable definitions. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses below each coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: IRS monitoring 
Dependent variable: NI proxy (1) (2) (3) 
 NI t+1 NIBT t+1 NIBDT t+1 
    
POST_SSAP101×IRS_AUDIT×NI proxy 0.390*** 0.427*** 0.278*** 
 (0.078) (0.086) (0.066) 
POST_SSAP101×IRS_AUDIT -31.438 -0.387 13.683 
 (21.951) (24.162) (24.825) 
IRS_AUDIT×NI proxy -0.006 0.036** 0.012 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
POST_SSAP101×NI proxy 0.018*** 0.008 0.008 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
POST_SSAP101 3.432 -0.833 -2.862 
 (4.538) (4.976) (5.134) 
IRS_AUDIT 165.249*** 168.872*** 158.964*** 
 (17.377) (19.241) (19.837) 
NI proxy 0.713*** 0.711*** 0.747*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
    
Control Variables Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.68 0.71 0.73 
N 5,499 5,499 5,499 
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Table 7: SSAP 101 adoption and the earnings persistence of insurance companies (continued) 
 
Panel B reports the test results for the effect of SSAP 101 adoption on insurers’ earnings persistence using private 
firm status (PRIVATE) as the partitioning variable. Note that observations at the adoption of SSAP 101 (t = 2012) 
are dropped. For the period before SSAP 101 adoption, Earnings t+1 ends at the year 2012, with Earnings t as the 
year 2011. For the period after SSAP 101 adoption, Earnings t begins with 2013 and Earnings t+1 is 2014. A 
constant term is included but not reported. Please refer to Appendix 1 for variable definitions. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel B: Private insurers 
Dependent variable: NI proxy (1) (2) (3) 
 NI t+1 NIBT t+1 NIBDT t+1 
    
POST_SSAP101×PRIVATE×NI proxy 0.611** 0.681** 0.412** 
 (0.248) (0.266) (0.181) 
POST_SSAP101×IRS_AUDIT -2.559 -6.173 -5.422 
 (4.440) (4.699) (4.470) 
PRIVATE×NI proxy -0.444*** -0.483*** -0.309*** 
 (0.152) (0.147) (0.108) 
POST_SSAP101×NI proxy 0.017** 0.016** 0.013 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) 
POST_SSAP101 -0.132 3.627 3.811 
 (4.695) (5.020) (4.948) 
PRIVATE -1.694 0.338 -0.578 
 (2.301) (2.487) (2.619) 
NI proxy 0.817*** 0.836*** 0.838*** 
 (0.042) (0.038) (0.033) 
    
Control Variables Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.71 0.72 
N 5,499 5,499 5,499 
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Table 8: SSAP 101 adoption and firm risk 
 
This table reports the test results for the effect of SSAP 101 adoption on insurers’ overall risk between 2009 and 
2014. A constant term is included but not reported. Please refer to Appendix 1 for variable definitions. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: ROA_VOLATILITY (1) (2) (3) 
    
POST_SSAP101 -0.004*** 0.001 -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
POST_SSAP101×IRS_AUDIT  -0.021**  
  (0.010)  
POST_SSAP101×PRIVATE   -0.073*** 
   (0.009) 
IRS_AUDIT  -0.002 0.024*** 
  (0.009) (0.008) 
PRIVATE -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
TAIL -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
RATE_REGULATION -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SIZE  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HERFINDAHL_LINE 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
HERFINDAHL_STATE -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
NPW_PERSONAL -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
NPW_COMMERCIAL -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
REINSURANCE -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
NPW_GROWTH 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GROUP_AFFILIATION -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FAMILY 0.002** 0.002** 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
    
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.06 0.07 
N 6,562 6,562 6,562 
 
